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Abstract
This paper examines trends in the operation and financial performance of major UK house-
builders shortly before, during and after the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008. It out-
lines two contrasting explanations of what has happened in the sector over this period. 
The first is described as an ‘institutional recovery’ perspective, in which a period of initial 
retrenchment after the crash was followed by steady reinvestment, and then a cautious move 
back to growth by the major housebuilding companies. This is set against what we describe 
as a ‘financialised recovery’ perspective. This explanation stems from our own analysis 
of the annual accounts of major UK housebuilders since 2005. It reveals the impact of the 
intensive financialisation of a sector initially weakened by the GFC, but where the strate-
gic primacy of maximising shareholder value has been asserted more strongly than before. 
Our analysis of dividend payments post-GFC reveals this in the starkest of terms. We sug-
gest that the sector has been in more robust financial health than implied by the ‘institu-
tional recovery’ narrative, but that significant value is being extracted out of these compa-
nies, and indeed the sector overall, by institutional investors. The analysis provides unique 
insights into the financialisation of housing production, an issue which to date has received 
only limited attention. We reflect on the implications of identified trends for housing sup-
ply in the UK. We also sketch future research possibilities to examine the ongoing impact 
of intensive financialisation and the capital flows into, and out of, major housebuilders.
Keywords Financialisation · Housebuilding · Housing supply
1 Introduction
This paper examines how financial processes connected with housing production in the 
UK have changed in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007/8. By track-
ing patterns from before the GFC emerged, it focuses on changes in the financial perfor-
mance of the largest nine housebuilding companies that are responsible for developing 
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nearly half of the annual housing output in the UK.1 Previous research (Payne 2015, 2019) 
into the performance of large UK housebuilders, based on accounts given by developers 
themselves, has suggested that these companies struggled to recover from the GFC  and 
took time to reinvest, before moving into modest growth. Subsequently, their growth has 
been constrained by various factors, such as land availability, capacity and planning direc-
tives. However, our analysis shows that this narrative fails to take account of a central issue 
in these trends—the scale and impact of profit making and value extraction from the UK 
housing system since 2007/8.
In this paper, we assess an ‘internal’ narrative of institutional recovery against a broader 
analysis of trends revealed within the audited financial accounts of these companies. We 
trace movements in housing completions, profits and dividends in order to chart the pat-
terns of capital flows in the sector. This analysis reveals a sharp increase in the scale of 
value extraction from the sector since 2010. We move on to estimate the consequences of 
this trend for the price of new dwellings and the level of housing completions that has been 
achieved. The paper is therefore intended as a contribution to literature on the financialisa-
tion of the housing system, focussed on housing production, examining recent trends in 
capital flows and value extraction. We tease out the implications for attempts to increase 
housing supply in the face of what the UK Government has itself described as a ‘broken’ 
housing market (MHCLG 2017).
In the following sections, we set out the specific focus of the paper, in relation to the 
broader literature on housing financialisation. The changing shape of the UK housebuild-
ing sector is then charted, alongside insights into the responses of major housebuilders to 
the GFC. We then outline methods for more detailed analysis of financial processes, before 
presenting our analysis of housing output, revenue, profit making, and the use of dividends. 
The role of shareholders is then explored through a case study, examining the investments 
and value extraction by one major investor in UK housing. The paper finishes with a dis-
cussion of the implications of our empirical analysis for housing supply and for future 
research into housing financialisation.
2  Blindspots in the analysis of housing financialisation?
Real estate, including housing, performs a dual purpose in many modern economies, as 
both a tradable asset within financial markets, and as a commodity for private consumption 
(Aalbers et al. 2020). However these distinct, and sometimes competing functions, make it 
a weak link in many economic systems, made more apparent as real estate has been gradu-
ally transformed into liquid financial assets (Van Loon and Aalbers 2017). As scholars have 
grappled with these changes and their implications, there has been a rapid growth in lit-
erature on the financialisation of housing and other forms of real estate, with much of this 
focusing on the UK, USA and Europe (Aalbers 2016, 2017b; Fernandez and Aalbers 2016; 
Jacobs and Manzi 2019). Financialisation has become such a ubiquitous term that the ques-
tion has been posed about whether the term retains any heuristic value, given its broad 
reach and the extent to which it has taken on different connotations in different contexts. 
Brett Christophers (2015) has called for a tighter delineation of the term, following on from 
1 Size is determined by revenue derived from UK housebuilding activity. The tenth largest private house-
builder is not a publicly listed company, and hence, comparable data on financial and operational perfor-
mance are not available.
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Engelen’s (2008) concerns about the risks of ‘conceptual stretching’, so that it turns from 
a ‘buzzword’ to a ‘fuzzword’ (Ashman and Fine 2013, pp. 156–7). We would suggest that 
the word has not been emptied of all meaning and would follow the broad but serviceable 
definition of financialisation provided by Manuel Aalbers, as the “increasing dominance of 
financial actors, markets, practices, measurements and narratives, transforming economies, 
firms (including financial institutions), states and households” (Aalbers 2017a,).
Previous analyses of the financialisation of housing have tended to focus on organisa-
tions, products and individuals involved in the process of housing exchange. Past research, 
notably in European and US contexts, unveiled the financialising processes arising from, 
for instance, the privatisation of building societies as providers of mortgage finance (Boddy 
1989; Martin and Turner 2000), the securitisation of mortgage loans (Aalbers and Enge-
len 2015; Wainwright 2009), and the rise of subprime lending (Langley 2008; Immergluck 
2010). This focus has since been complemented by research into the impact of financiali-
sation on organisations involved in housing investment and provision, which has covered 
issues such as the entry of private equity, hedge funds and Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs) into the rental market (Fields and Uffer 2016; Waldron 2018). The rise of ‘for 
profit’ housing associations in the UK such as Sage (a subsidiary of Man Group) or Black-
stone are also recent examples of what is likely to become a growing trend (Manzi and 
Morrison 2018), as elsewhere in Europe (Janoschka et al. 2019). The boundaries between 
non-profit and profit-making functions are increasingly blurred. This has not just been 
about the arrival of new ‘players’ in making funds available for capital investment; it is 
about the increasing penetration of public (Hodkinson 2011) and quasi-public sector (Gruis 
2008; Mullins et  al. 2017) agencies by financial capital and associated financial logics 
(Smyth et al. 2019). And these efforts to capture value from affordable housing are not the 
sole preserve of traditional financial actors. Public bodies, with responsibilities for deliver-
ing affordable housing, are also mirroring speculative activities, as they develop new vehi-
cles to capture value from public assets. As Beswick and Penny (2018) show, some local 
authorities are replacing traditional social housing with new developments and new tenan-
cies which enables such homes to become a liquid financial asset.
Such evidence may be situated in broader conceptions of present-day financialised 
capitalism, notably in Thomas Piketty’s work Capital in the 21st Century (Piketty 2014). 
Piketty’s underlying thesis about modern economies where R > G, when R is the rate of 
return and G is the extent of capital growth or economic output, is of significance to stud-
ies of housing financialisation. Fernandez and Aalbers (2017) argue that what is required, 
in order to anchor these theories, is further empirical analysis of the cultural, geographical 
and sectoral differences in how the pattern of R > G actually play out, not as the product of 
a free-floating economic ’law’:
We argue that the institutional and ideational structure under which the “metamor-
phosis of capital” takes place is not a by-product of R > G but central to its develop-
ment and should therefore be at the heart of the analysis that tries to understand its 
variegation across space and time. (p. 152).
This asserts the importance of empirical studies which help us to understand the ‘meta-
morphosis of capital’ within different parts of the housing system, and in specific institu-
tional and geographic settings.
One part of the housing system that has received little empirical attention to date, in 
terms of financialisation and role of financial actors, is that of housing production. Much 
of the focus in the literature so far has been on the way in which financial interests and 
logics have penetrated agencies in the public or the quasi-public sector. This process of 
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encroachment or ‘capture’ does not apply in the same way to housebuilders, which are 
private companies from the outset. So the interest here is less on any underlying change of 
‘mission’ among these organisations, or the impact of financialisation on the stated values 
of the companies, but more prosaically on what happens to the money—through changing 
capital flows and imposing a higher priority on extracting value from the production pro-
cess. This has implications for outputs—getting new houses built. As housing supply is a 
primary concern of public policy, in the UK as elsewhere in Europe, this does differentiate 
housing from many other economic goods and services that the private sector produces.
Accounts given by housebuilders themselves suggest that they have been involved in 
an ongoing process of adaptation to changing market circumstances, derisking and mod-
erating their return on investment in harder times, while moving to expansion when eco-
nomic prospects improve. This narrative has been reflected in some of the research into the 
behaviour of major UK housebuilders in responding to the GFC (Payne 2015, 2019). More 
critical accounts of the role of housebuilders in the pursuit of financial gain at the expense 
of supply have focuses on their practices on land acquisition and speculation (Robertson 
2017). We would, however, suggest this still gives a restricted view of the recent transfor-
mations in the UK housebuilding sector, by overlooking or marginalising the importance 
of flows of capital and value extraction.
The fact that few studies have been undertaken of processes for raising and distributing 
capital in housing production has been pointed out by Alice Romainville (2017). In her 
research, Romainville studied the granting of building permits in Brussels during the 2000s 
to show, inter alia, how the share of financial capital in housing production has increased, 
so that two-thirds of active developers had a connection to an economic sector other than 
real estate. Her research provided metrics to assess the extent to which those developers 
engaged in housing production in one major city are investing capital derived from their 
financial activities. Her approach to tracing capital to its source has been an important con-
tribution to the methodological toolkit for assessing the impact of financialisation.
The empirical focus of this paper is a little different from Romainville’s, as it is lodged 
at the national rather than the local level. It is concerned more with capital flows into and 
out of the production process, and the interests of actors such as shareholders in large 
housebuilding companies in the UK. Along with ownership of and access to land, these 
processes are a crucial launching-point for the financialisation of housing. Building on ear-
lier analysis (Archer and Cole 2016), we examine the financial activities and performance 
of major housebuilding firms and show how outputs and levels of profitability and divi-
dends have changed since 2005. This study is pitched at a ‘meso’-level of analysis (van der 
Zwan 2014), concerned with institutional behaviour (Jacobs and Manzi 2019) and the use 
of particular ‘technologies’ such as financial metrics and accounting (Froud et al. 2000), 
rather than with either global capital flows, at the macro-level, or the financialisation of 
everyday life, at the micro-level.
3  The changing shape of the UK housebuilding sector
The recent financial and operational performance of large UK housebuilding firms should 
be set within the context of long-term structural changes in the sector. The development 
of large housebuilders in the form of public limited companies (PLCs)—giving them 
greater access to development finance and enabling them to exert more power in land mar-
kets—has been crucial to this process. In 1980, there were over 10,000 small and medium 
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enterprise (SME) housebuilders active in Great Britain, building 57% of all new housing; 
by 2014, this had dropped to 3000 SME builders delivering just 27% of all new dwellings 
(Lyons 2014).
Mirroring this shrinkage at the bottom of the market has been a concentration of market 
share at the top. Welling’s (2006) examination of market shares in the sector showed that 
the biggest ten private housebuilders produced 28% of new national supply in 1980. By 
2015, the biggest ten housebuilding firms were producing 47% all new homes (Archer and 
Cole 2016). The process of consolidation and merger among the major companies has not 
always led to an increase in production. The output of the merged firms has often fallen, 
compared to the combined output of those firms beforehand (Griffiths 2011).
This concentration in market share at the top is a familiar aspect of corporate change. 
The reason why this is especially important in the housebuilding sector is its direct link to 
the achievement of public policy goals—notably increasing new housing supply. Housing 
policies and housing subsidies from the UK government have tended to focus on housing 
demand over the past thirty years or so, epitomised by the increasing reliance on Housing 
Benefit to help those in the social and private rented sector meet their housing costs (Cooke 
and Davies 2014).
There has been sporadic recognition of the supply problem in UK housing. The ‘Barker 
review’ of housing supply in 2004, which was commissioned by the UK Treasury, argued 
for the construction of an additional 70,000–120,000 dwellings a year in order to depress 
the increase in housing unaffordability (Barker 2004). This analysis was revisited ten years 
later (Home Builders Federation 2014) when it was suggested that the additional short-
fall in the UK that had accrued during this period (which included the GFC) amounted to 
953,000 homes. Nevertheless, the reliance on demand-centred subsidies, primarily through 
Housing Benefit and the new Universal Credit system, prevailed. The emphasis shifted 
towards housing supply under the Theresa May government of 2017–19. This included set-
ting an annual target for the production of new dwellings, rising to 300,000 by 2022. The 
UK government has recognised the risks of over-reliance on the small number of large 
firms that exert a powerful influence on overall supply (MHCLG 2017). This prompted 
some initiatives intended to revive the ailing SME housebuilding sector (HM Government 
2015; MHCLG 2016) to ‘rebalance’ the industry. This renewed focus on housing supply 
has therefore drawn attention to recent trends in housing output, especially among larger 
housebuilders.
4  The response of major UK housebuilders to the GFC
The GFC had an immediate and dramatic effect on housebuilding in the UK, as in many 
other countries. Output by the largest nine UK housebuilders fell from 70,000 in 2007 to 
45,000 in 2010. The views of developers about the process of recovery from this low point 
have been covered in Payne’s research (Payne 2015, 2019), drawing on interviews with 
Chief Executives, Managing Directors and Land Directors from twenty three major build-
ers in the UK. The respondents provided a legitimation of the business strategies their com-
panies have followed since 2008. Payne identifies three distinct phases in their response to 
the GFC: investment, recovery and growth.
In the first phase, developers sought to restore some economic and fiscal balance fol-
lowing the shockwaves of GFC by facing down debt. Housebuilders claimed that they 
were adopting a more cautious and diligent approach to investment than before the GFC, 
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when volume output had been the primary driver of business activity (Payne 2015). Most 
housebuilders found themselves highly geared as a result of pre-recession lending and so 
focused on generating cash to reinvest into their businesses—partly through rights issues 
and building out existing sites at better margins—rather making returns to shareholders. 
The investment phase was therefore characterised as a period when large housebuilders 
diligently used conventional business strategies to secure cash returns and secure higher 
margins, in order to recover their position. This recovery was then followed by the growth 
stage, where land acquired since the GFC was developed predominantly where it could 
deliver better margins and return on capital. It was also at this point that the government 
introduced the Help to Buy programme, providing equity loans to households so they could 
afford to access mortgage finance for new housing (National Audit Office 2019). The pro-
gramme enabled builders to commit more confidently to construction programmes, reduce 
their reliance on inducements for purchasers, better predict future cash flows, and maxim-
ise land values to secure more development sites.
Payne found that as some housebuilders moved into the growth phase and they began 
opening more outlets and increasing capacity and output. However, respondents sug-
gested that this move back to growth had been hampered by ’constraints’ (Payne 2019, p. 
12), such as planning delays and skills and materials shortages. Housebuilders continued 
to take refuge in conventional strategies to navigate their way through the recovery and 
invested their capital in land and development in more familiar and stable housing markets, 
to maintain or improve margins. Housebuilders therefore drew on existing organisational 
routines and repertoires in their response to the GFC, with government support through 
Help to Buy providing a more secure economic environment for investment. Their strate-
gies focused on achieving more efficient returns on capital rather than radically changing 
the volume of output.
The picture that emerges from this analysis is of an industry making repairs to the dam-
age caused by the GFC, moving ahead with cautious reinvestment, helped along by Help 
to Buy, and then constrained from further growth by factors such as land supply, capacity 
constraints and what was described as an ’unresponsive’ planning system. The industry, 
sometimes criticised for a lack of innovation (Ball 1999), relied on established practices to 
generate returns through increasing margin rather than output. This analysis, reproducing 
an account ‘from within’ about the nature of the housebuilder response to the GFC, makes 
little or no reference to major changes in financial performance and priorities. This elite 
narrative is directed towards internal institutional changes, capacity and policy constraints, 
such as the onerous planning regime, rather than the financial environment in which the 
companies operated. Their account therefore offers a partial picture at best, as it neglects 
the impact of capital flows into, and outflows from, the sector. Far more dramatic changes 
were taking place here than this ‘institutional recovery’ paradigm suggests. Before taking 
account of these wider trends, we outline the methods used in our analysis of the financial 
performance of major housebuilders since 2006.
5  Methods for the analysis of financial and operational data
This study draws on information provided in the annual reports and accounts of the 
UK’s largest nine private housebuilders (in terms of their revenue). It has captured 
and analysed data from 126 annual financial reports. These reports cover the pre- and 
post-GFC period from 2005 to 2017, enabling changes in financial and operational 
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performance to be tracked longitudinally. Data have been organised in a form which 
makes analysis possible for both individual firms and in aggregate. This is important 
given the large market share of these firms and their collective role in shaping the mar-
ket for new housing nationally.
International accounting standards ensure that the financial data provided by each 
housebuilding firm is in a standard form. The International Financial Reporting Stand-
ards (IFRS) do not guarantee that financial figures for two firms are referring to iden-
tical financial activities, nor do they assure total transparency in terms of underlying 
activities (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008). Nonetheless, they are a mandatory set of report-
ing standards that offer a means for comparison and aggregation of financial informa-
tion across firms.
This paper presents analysis of key financial and operational data for these firms, 
principally concerning their revenues, profit before tax (before exceptional items), year-
end profit, dividends paid, proceeds from the issue of new share capital, new dwelling 
completions and average sales prices. The decision to look at profit before tax before 
exceptional items was taken on the grounds that this better reflects the normal busi-
ness activities of firms without, for instance, factoring in the yearly adjustments in the 
estimated value of land and other assets. To ensure this measure is not taken as the 
sole indicator of profitability, changes in year-end profit were also assessed. This meas-
ure does factor in exceptional items, levels of taxation and so on. Wherever possible, 
data have been drawn from segmental analysis in the financial accounts, in order to 
isolate UK activity only and that which is related purely to housebuilding rather than 
income and expenditure on other activities, such as commercial property construction 
or property investment more broadly. Furthermore, rather than use future dividend com-
mitments in the narrative sections of the annual reports, we draw dividend information 
from the audited accounts, via the consolidated cashflow statements.
We have amalgamated the above data with information about the ten largest insti-
tutional shareholdings in each firm and the investors holding those shares (Financial 
Times 2017). To explore capital flows into and out of the UK’s housing supply sys-
tem in detail, we examine in more detail one of the largest shareholders in UK’s major 
housebuilders, Norges Bank Investment Management (henceforth Norges). Our research 
focused on Norges as, at the time of study, they held shares in nearly all of the larg-
est private housebuilders in the UK (eight out of the nine biggest firms). The selection 
of Norges was also a pragmatic decision, given their transparent approach to reporting 
investments, and difficulties in obtaining comparable information for other institutional 
investors and asset managers. Norges investments are open to analysis through publicly 
available data on all their holdings, which are updated each year. These holdings are 
categorised into three types: equities (such as shareholdings); real estate investments; 
and fixed-income investments (such as government or corporate bonds). Analysis of 
these holdings in 2016, and how they changed from 2015, made it possible to identify 
new investments that could be providing new capital for housing production.
It is important to note that Norges may not be representative of the broader class 
of large investors in UK housebuilders, in terms of the extent of new capital it pro-
vides for housing production on an annual basis. However, it is difficult to assess this, 
given the lack of data on holdings by other investors and asset managers. To assess 
Norges’ returns in dividends from UK housebuilders, alongside the investments it made 
in broader housing production activity, all of its equity and fixed-income investments in 
2015 and 2016 were analysed (Norges Bank Investment Management 2017). The case 
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study provides a more nuanced assessment of the complexity of capital flows into and 
out of the UK housing system.
6  Trends in supply, revenue and profit among the largest UK 
housebuilders
Previous research (Archer and Cole 2014, 2016) has provided a close inspection of the 
financial accounts of the largest private housebuilders in the UK. This examines changes 
between 2008 and 2015 in profit levels, housing completions, changes in the geographical 
distribution of new housing and in the use of surpluses by the largest nine UK housebuild-
ers. Clear patterns emerged in this work, suggesting that revenues, profits and dividends 
were expanding at a disproportionately faster rate than the output of new housing (Archer 
and Cole, 2016). For the purposes of this article, the analysis has been extended in terms of 
both the financial measures analysed and the time frame covered.
The timeline for the current analysis has been taken back to 2005, before the GFC, and 
run forward to 2017. Figure 1 shows the total completions, revenue and profit before tax 
(PBT) of the largest nine housebuilders for this period. The impact of the GFC is clearly 
evident in the period 2007 to 2011, with 2009 representing the nadir in terms of revenue 
and PBT. The ‘institutional recovery’ narrative of the developers suggests that it took the 
industry several years to build back their finances after the devastation caused by the GFC 
and that this is reflected in modest year-on-year increases in output. This rationale is not, 
however, a comprehensive, or indeed accurate, picture of actual trends.
Figure 2 shows that between 2010 and 2017, the revenue and PBT of the nine largest 
housebuilders increased at a much more rapid annual rate than their housing completions. 
During this period, the output of new homes grew by 70 per cent, from 45,000 units in 
2010 to 76,000 in 2017. But over the same period revenues increased by 178 per cent, 




















































Revenue Profit Before Tax Completions
Fig. 1  Revenue, profit before tax and completions for the nine largest UK housebuilders (2005–2017). 
Source: Housebuilder accounts (2005–2017)
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by some firms as the successful outcome of ’prioritising margin over volume’ (Taylor 
Wimpey 2011, p. 1).
Comparisons with the pre-GFC era bring into question the assumption that this was simply 
a period of ’recovery’. By 2014, profitability for these nine firms had almost returned to the 
pre-GFC peak of 2006. By 2015, PBT stood some 45% higher than pre-GFC levels. By 2017, 
these housebuilding firms were generating over 100% more profit than they were before the 
financial crash. This was more than a ’recovery’; it was a feast after the fast, and one which 
had taken profitmaking among large UK housebuilders to historically unprecedented lev-
els. While the level of profitmaking had doubled in this period, in terms of housing supply 
the largest housebuilders developed only 1600 more homes in 2017 compared to 2006, an 
increase of just two percent.
In the period between 2010 and 2017, firms decided to stretch the gap between unit 
costs and the sales price per unit, in pursuit of higher profitability per housing completion. 
Of course, profitability might have been pursued by maintaining profit margins and rapidly 
increasing production, but this strategy was not favoured. As we have seen, the tendency to 
focus on margins was noted by developers themselves as they made strategic choices after the 
GFC. What is, however, absent from their own narrative is any recognition of the scale of the 
divergence between trends in output, revenue and profit. The developers’ discourse is one that 
depicts them as licking their wounds after the GFC, and duly playing safe in their subsequent 
investments, while acquiring land at attractive rates. In fact, the modest increases in output 
since 2010 mask a much greater transformation in the levels of profitability achieved. Larger 
housebuilders were not, according to these figures, struggling to maintain their margins—they 































Percentage change in completions
Percentage change in revenue
Percentage change in profit before tax
Fig. 2  Year-on-year changes ‘in financial and operational measures for the biggest nine UK housebuilders 
(2006–2017). Note Yearly change is shown from 2006 onwards, using 2005 figures as the basis for the first 
annual change.  Source: Housebuilder accounts (2005–2017)
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7  Profitability, Dividends and Value Extraction
As Figs. 1 and 2 show, the profits of large housebuilders increased markedly from 2010, 
although the rate of this growth year on year has slowed since 2014. One measure, how-
ever, has continued to grow every year since the GFC; that is the ratio of PBT to housing 
completions. This is essentially a measure of return on investment and is a signal of how 
far major housebuilders have shifted their business strategy to more financialised models. 
In 2008, the ratio of profit to each new dwelling completed was £21,545—that is, for every 
house built £21,545 of profit before tax was derived. This ratio then slumped in 2009, in 
the midst of the GFC, but has increased consistently year on year. In 2017, for every unit 
developed £62,702 of PBT was created (Table 1). This trend challenges the narrative of 
housebuilders that they have been slowly recovering before a return to growth, Table  1 
reveals these increases in the ratio of PBT per unit between 2005 and 2017, showing how it 
nearly doubled over that period.
The above trends, in part, reflect the growth in end sale prices of the new homes built. 
In the perennial discussions about the causes of rising house prices in England, reference is 
made to a range of contributory supply and demand factors, but the increasing profit ’take’ 
per new home is rarely included in these discussions. Figure 3 shows the average sale price 
of new homes built by the largest housebuilders between 2005 and 2017. In 2005, new 
homes built by Barratts, for example, were 12% above the average national house price. 
After the GFC slump, price growth returned, so that by 2013 Barratt’s units were sell-
ing—on average—at a 14% higher price than the national average. By 2017, Barratt’s sales 
prices were 26% above the average UK house price. In absolute terms, new homes com-
pleted by Barratts were nearly £49 k more than the average price of a UK home in 2017. 
The increasing level of profitability per housing unit produced is therefore reflected in 
higher average sale prices of new homes.
The increases in revenue and profitability since 2010 have continued well beyond 
a point where it can be seen as simply compensating for any legacy losses stemming 
from the GFC, or as prudently insulating the business from future shocks. In practice, 
Table 1  Ratio of completions to 
profit before tax (PBT) for the 
nine largest UK housebuilders 
(2005–2017)
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this has resulted in significant gains for both shareholders and executives. On rare occa-
sions, shareholders may kick back against extreme outcomes for incentivising company 
executives. One such occasion was the disclosure in December 2017 of the bonus pay-
ments made to senior executives at the housebuilders Persimmon, in which the Chief 
Executive, Jeff Fairburn, stood to gain around £120 million, the Finance Director £77 
million and the Managing Director £38 million. Financial sector interests represented 
on the board were concerned that the scale of the pay deals, and the consequent press 
coverage, would wreak reputational damage. Euan Stirling, Head of Stewardship at the 
major investor Aberdeen Standard, which owned a 2.3% stake in Persimmon at the time, 
disapproved of the deal, saying that ’regardless of any moral or societal duties, com-
pany directors have a legal responsibility to act in the best long-term interests of the 
company that employs them’ (The Independent 2018). The Persimmon deal was there-
fore presented as an anomaly or an outlier, the unacceptable face of finance capitalism, 
rather than just one end of a spectrum in the trend of rapidly inflating pay outs for senior 
executives across the housebuilding sector.
Trends in other forms of capital outflow reveal the growing influence of financial 
interests in UK housing production. Returns to shareholders through dividends have 
reached unprecedented levels in recent times, as shown in Fig. 4. In the years leading up 
to 2009—depicted as a ‘risk taking’ boom by proponents of the institutional recovery 
narrative—dividends from the largest nine housebuilders had followed a fairly steady 
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Fig. 3  Average sale prices for the biggest nine UK housebuilders and the average UK house price (2005–
2017). Sources: Housebuilder accounts (2005–2017) and Land Registry House Price Index (Average Price 
All Properties—2005–2017)
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£464 m. The figure for 2017, by contrast, stood at £1.8bn, dwarfing the levels of divi-
dends paid in the years leading up to the GFC.
This marked growth in dividend payments has increased as a proportion of annual 
profits, not just in terms of absolute value. For the nine biggest housebuilders, dividend 
payments were running at approximately twenty per cent of year-end profits in 2005 and 
2006, rising to just over thirty per cent in 2007. During the GFC dividends continued 
to be paid, but on year-end losses. As housebuilding firms returned to profitability this 
ratio increased sharply, rising from seven per cent of year-end profits in 2010 to 39% in 
2015. This figure is higher than that for the pre-GFC ‘boom years’, and the percentage 
continued to move upwards. In 2017 dividends amounted to fully 50% of year-end profit 
(Fig. 5).
One response to these figures might be that distributing surpluses in this manner is not 
an inherent problem or a morally dubious activity. The funds derived by shareholders from 
dividends may, in time, be reinvested back into the economy in productive ways, perhaps 
even supporting further housebuilding, so the argument runs. One way to test this claim is 
to examine the activities of shareholders in the largest housebuilding firms, i.e. those who 
have benefited most from this step-change in dividend payments. Using data provided by 
the Financial Times (2017), it was possible to identify the ten investors with the largest 
shareholdings in the UK’s biggest housebuilders. This analysis revealed that the largest 
investors held shares in multiple housebuilding firms. Indeed, three investment managers 
(Legal and General Investment Management, Norges Investment Management, Vanguard 
Group) were among in the largest shareholders in eight of the nine biggest housebuild-
ers. Through this, these organisations can exert significant influence not just on one house-
building firm and its financial decisions, but on the industry at large. They could assert 













































Fig. 4  Total dividends paid per year by the nine largest UK housebuilders (2005–2017).  Source: House-
builder accounts (2005–2017)
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what the ramifications of selling their shares would be for wider confidence in the firm and 
its stock price.
The global nature of financial interest in UK housebuilders is indicated by the fact that 
many of the largest shareholders were not UK investment managers. For instance, an esti-
mated 71%\ of all shares in Taylor Wimpey were, at the time of data collection, held by 
investment managers based overseas. The surpluses created by housebuilders, and then 
paid out in dividends, are likely to flow well beyond UK shores, and potentially be rein-
vested outside of the UK’s housing market. This makes it challenging to assess the ultimate 
impact of such large-scale distribution of surpluses on domestic housing production. It also 
poses serious questions about the prospects for decisive intervention in these processes by 
any national government that is seeking to ramp up housing supply.
The nature of the relationship between UK housebuilders and their shareholders, and 
the implications of this for capital flows, can perhaps be understood better by focusing not 
on the housebuilding firm, but on individual shareholders. As we have noted, shareholder 
influence is largely absent from the ‘institutional recovery’ narrative provided by execu-
tives in their accounts of post-GFC corporate performance, but it is a key factor in the sys-
tem of housing production overall.
8  Tracing capital flows: The Case of Norges Bank Investment 
Management
The above analysis underlines the scale and implications of large extractions of capital 
from the UK housing production system—by a relatively small set of financial actors. 
But it remains unclear whether shareholders are simply net extractors of value or whether 
they exist in a more symbiotic relationship with housebuilders to create value. It might be 
argued, for example, that capital flows to investors—in the form of dividends—are a worth-
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Fig. 5  Dividends paid as a percentage of profits for the year, for the nine largest UK housebuilders (2005–
2017).  Source: Housebuilder accounts (2005–2017)
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housing system. Indeed, if these capital flows from investors are equal to (or greater than) 
the capital flows back to them (in the form of dividends), then it might be claimed that such 
dividends are an integral part of the financing of new housing supply. Further analysis was 
therefore required to see if major shareholders—as beneficiaries of large increases in divi-
dends—were imparting additional capital back into the housing system.
Tracing capital flows is far from straightforward, as it requires delving into the highly 
complex circuitry of modern, global finance, where obfuscation is part of its raison d’etre 
(Kay 2015). Nonetheless, where information about investments made can be combined 
with information about dividend returned, it is possible to trace capital flows between indi-
vidual investors and UK housebuilders. In examining such data, only those investments 
which impart new capital for housing production should be classed as a capital inflow. 
When an individual or institution purchases shares in a company that are already in circula-
tion, it does not impart new capital into the firm; it is merely trading with another inves-
tor. Only when a shareholder purchases new shares (for instance, through an Initial Public 
Offering issued by a housebuilder) can this be considered new capital for housing produc-
tion. Other investments may also provide new capital; for instance, through the purchase 
of government bonds which are then invested in housing-related activity, or by providing 
loans and other debt finance directly to the housebuilding firm.
Using this understanding of capital flows, we have sought to understand the role and 
flows in one specific case, Norges Bank Investment Management (henceforth Norges), 
which is the asset management unit of the Norwegian central bank. At the time of study, 
Norges had major shareholdings in eight of the nine largest UK housebuilders.
8.1  Capital inflows—investments by Norges to support UK housebuilding
Analysis of Norges real estate holdings in 2016 shows they focused largely on retail, logis-
tics and office sites. This followed the strategic decision not to invest in the residential 
and hotel sectors,2 and hence, these investments were unlikely to have directly facilitated 
the production of housing in the UK. However, Norges’ fixed-income investments did pro-
vide capital to support such activity in the year of study. The organisation acquired nearly 
£33 million of UK government bonds in PRS Finance PLC, which has the aim of increas-
ing ’the supply of new, purpose built and professionally managed private rented sector 
homes’.3 In addition to this, Norges made one equity investment which might be classed 
as providing new capital for housebuilding. Norges purchased approximately £12.5 mil-
lion worth of new shares in McCarthy and Stone, a large builder4 specialising in retire-
ment housing. These shares—purchased as part of an Initial Public Offering—would, it 
was hoped, "provide flexibility for further investment in land and building" (McCarthy 
and Stone 2015, p.13). Other investments to support the production of housing were more 
difficult to trace. Norges held other relevant bonds, acquired in previous years, but direct 
investments in 2016 amounted to a capital inflow to the UK housing production system of 
just over £45 million.
2 See https ://www.nbim.no/conte ntass ets/e16eb 87c37 294c0 fabcc a8295 1f89a c0/real-estat e-inves tment 
s-2017---gover nment -pensi on-fund-globa l.pdf.
3 See http://www.venn-partn ers.com/prs/.
4 McCarthy and Stone had an operating profit of £96.2 m and a profit margin of 15 per cent in 2017.
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8.2  Capital outflows—capital extracted by Norges from UK housebuilding
Norges made substantial capital returns on their equity investments in 2016. Its share-
holdings in the biggest UK housebuilders generated over £35 million in dividends in this 
year. The biggest capital gains, however, were made in relation to increasing share prices. 
Changes in Norges’ equity holdings in the UK’s biggest housebuilders generated financial 
gains in the region of £122 million in 2016. This figure relates simply to the increased 
value of shares arising from movements in share price between March 2015 and March 
2016. Norges reported reduced market values for its shareholdings in certain housebuilders 
in 2016, due to selling-off of shares to realise capital returns. For instance, Norges reduced 
its stake in Berkeley Group in 2016 and, even in the context of a falling share price, this 
realised a return of between £18–22 million from this sale of shares (Norges 2017).
Hence, the £45 m of new capital offered by Norges to support housing production was 
therefore eclipsed by the capital flows back to them from dividends and share price gains, 
which total £158 m. The market value of Norges’ shares in UK housebuilders in December 
2015 was £664 m. By 2017 this had increased to £863 m (Norges 2017).
There is no a priori reason to presume that the practices of Norges are untypical in the 
sector. Some of the largest shareholders in UK housebuilders are extracting much more 
capital out of housing production than they are putting back into it. Ownership of shares 
in housebuilding companies provides a means for these institutions to shape strategies 
over the distribution of surpluses and to undertake activities which increase the underly-
ing share price. Reinvestment in productive activity is given less priority. This analysis 
also reveals a perverse circularity in the relationship between these financial interests and 
the government. The government raises finance from firms such as Norges—through gov-
ernment bonds which have the aim of increasing investment in affordable housing. At the 
same time, Norges and other investors pursue increased returns on equity investments in 
housebuilding firms arising from increasing profit margins and average sales prices, which 
exacerbate rather than mitigate affordability problems.
It should be acknowledged that major shareholders in private housebuilders are not all 
adopting the same strategies, as some are taking on a more proactive role in the hous-
ing market. For instance, Legal and General (Investment Management) receives signifi-
cant returns from shareholdings in eight of the biggest UK housebuilders, but the Legal 
and General group also contains subsidiaries which are competitor housebuilders,5 as the 
organisation makes investments in facilities for modular construction of housing6 and part-
nerships to build and rent for specific markets. However, only a few shareholders in the 
UK have so far gone down the route of direct housing provision, and there are examples 
of such a shift taking place elsewhere in Europe (Wijburg et  al. 2018). Overall, tracing 
capital flows prompts questions about the wider picture of leakage from the UK housing 
market, and the case of Norges exemplifies how the financing of private housebuilding is 
more about creating shareholder value than increasing housing supply. Any downstream 
economic benefits emanating from increased dividends are likely to be very diffuse, at best.
5 See https ://www.landg homes .com/.
6 See https ://www.legal andge neral .com/modul ar/.
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9  Discussion: financialisation and the post‑GFC Recovery
In assessing the results shown above, one might be open to an accusation of faux naivete 
in confessing surprise. Housebuilders are private companies, and the property and 
finance sectors have forever been closely intertwined; and they are profit seeking bod-
ies, not social enterprises or charitable institutions. What would one expect them to do? 
However, we would suggest that the extent to which the strategy, operation and business 
planning of large housebuilders have been influenced by financialised priorities and nar-
ratives since 2008 is now qualitatively different. This is reflected in the figures on divi-
dends and the ratio of dividends to profit, showing the scale of capital outflows running 
at levels that are historically unprecedented.
One distinctive aspect of financialisation is the extent to which what is produced by com-
panies becomes less important than how the asset or service can be utilised as a lever for 
increased borrowing, investment and growth maximisation through debt finance (Aalbers 
2015; Van Loon and Aalbers 2017; Gamble 2014). This trend is especially notable when 
what is being produced (or, indeed, not produced)—housing—is infused with state support 
in various ways and where housing supply is a key public policy concern. The financial 
performance of major housebuilders indicates how shareholder value has become more 
prominent in dictating how firms ought to be run, for short-term returns rather than for 
longer-term output growth—that is, building homes. As Mazzucato has suggested:
…far from being a lodestar of corporate management, maximising shareholder 
value turned into a catalyst for a set of mutually reinforcing trends which played 
up short-termism while downplaying the long-term view and a broader interpreta-
tion of whom the corporation should benefit. (Mazzucato 2018, pp. 166–7).
Under this process, executives are incentivised to deliver capital growth and higher 
dividends ahead of other objectives, such as productivity gains or increased output 
(Froud et al. 2006; Roberts et al. 2006). As a result, firms come under increasing pres-
sure to boost capital flows to the financial sector through interest payments, dividend 
payouts and share buy-backs (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Lazonick 2014). Long-
term investment, organisational development and product innovation take second place 
to short-term profit, outsourcing and share prices (Aalbers 2017a). Whilst not the focus 
of this paper, these processes may have been assisted by the consolidation in the indus-
try noted in section three. As the largest housebuilders have taken more market share, 
and mergers have tended to result in a net reduction in output, one might question if 
the move towards an oligopolistic model (Griffiths 2011) facilitates the financialisation 
process. As noted, nearly all the major shareholders in the biggest housebuilders have 
shares in several of those housebuilding firms. And given that these firms are responsi-
ble for such a significant proportion of national supply, the role of shareholders in shap-
ing new housing production has perhaps never been greater.
The increasing priority given to shareholder value and the dominance of ’impatient’ 
capital (Crotty 2003) are not, of course, idiosyncratic, post-GFC developments. As Lee 
et al (2009, pp. 727–8) suggest:
…financialisation is hardly a new phenomenon in circuits of capital. What is per-
haps relatively new is the extent to which finance has found its way into most, if 
not all, nooks and crannies of social life.
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What our analysis of major UK housebuilders adds to a longer-term perspective on 
the impact of financialisation is threefold. First, it provides empirical confirmation that 
the shock of GFC did not have a longer-term chastening effect, inhibiting the incur-
sions of finance capital into new territory. Indeed, it was quite the reverse, since it cre-
ated the opportunity for housebuilders to reformulate their business models, and then 
ramp up returns to shareholders. Second, it shows how housing production has become 
a prime site for capture by finance capital. Third, it helps to explain how the recovery 
of larger UK housebuilders since 2010 has only had a limited impact on housing out-
put: capital has been generated, but much of it has moved elsewhere, and supply has 
consistently fallen far short of government targets, despite the introduction of addi-
tional inducements, such as Help to Buy.
In terms of housing output, the continuing trend of historically low interest rates in 
the UK economy since 2010 might have been expected to encourage large-scale bor-
rowing for investment, once the financial wounds of the GFC had started to heal. This 
has not happened. Instead, the trend to maximise shareholder value has inhibited new 
investment, as the hurdle rate—the return on investment below which a company will 
not pursue an investment opportunity—is set higher. The cost of debt financing has 
been extremely low in recent years, but there has been an increasing margin between 
the cost of capital and expected returns from investment, especially if there are eas-
ier and potentially more lucrative alternatives to explore, such as share repurchases 
(Mazzacuto 2018: p. 176). This may help to explain developer caution to build more—
due less to the uncertain state of housing markets or the adoption of risk-averse busi-
ness practices, and more to the weight of shareholder expectations about what mar-
gins could and should be secured. This period of cheaper borrowing has not led to an 
increase in the level of investment in new construction that might have otherwise been 
anticipated.
Our analysis takes us into different territory about trends in the UK housebuilding 
sector than that covered by the institutional recovery narrative (Payne 2019), which 
makes only oblique reference to the need to seek new ways of maximising shareholder 
dividends and focuses instead on constraints such as the planning system. Publicly, the 
purpose of the organisations remains ostensibly unchanged, using cautious reinvest-
ment and judicious selection of sites and developments to extend activity. The major 
housebuilders in the UK often prefer to hold on to their name through institutional 
restructures, partly to convey a sense of stability and trust and display their long-stand-
ing reputational assets to make it ’as safe as houses’. This had happened to many UK 
building societies after deregulation in the mid-1980s (Martin and Turner 2000). Many 
of the larger housebuilders still hold on to a ‘family firm’ motif—Taylor Wimpey, Bar-
ratts, Persimmon—rather than a more corporate name. The image that is cultivated is 
that they are just like other, more humble builders, just bigger. Hulse (2019) describes 
a similar process at play in the discursive reframing of the private landlord. In fact, 
our examination of the recent financial performance of major housebuilders shows an 
increasing divergence in patterns of ownership, business priorities and financial per-
formance—not just from SME enterprises in the sector but also from the position they 
themselves held before the GFC. To explain housebuilders behaviour since the GFC 
we suggest more diligent consideration of the financial processes underpinning their 
operations. This reveals that the recovery of housebuilders was not the cautious, con-
strained variety argued by some (Payne 2015), but a financialised recovery focused on 
maximising profit margins and returns to shareholders.
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10  Conclusion
The analysis in this paper reveals striking increases in the profit per unit derived by the 
largest UK housebuilding companies in recent years, along with a historically unprec-
edented rise in their dividend payments. Our focus on organisational strategies, financial 
performance and the growing influence of shareholder value contrasts with the focus of 
others who look outward to explain the factors associated with housebuilder behaviour and 
the sluggishness of housing supply. The organisational focus adopted in this paper reveals 
the pervasiveness of global finance, and the scale of capital extracted through the hous-
ing production process. Huge financial sums are flowing out of the UK housing system, 
but they are largely invisible in housebuilders’ own narrative about their ’recovery’ since 
2007/8. The push and pull of capital flows is largely subterranean, beneath the public gaze 
and policy discourse. Occasionally, an extreme case of corporate largesse is revealed, as in 
the case of Persimmon Homes, but this is then seen as the exception not the rule.
The self-serving complexities of global finance (Kay 2015) present a formidable chal-
lenge to anybody attempting to ’follow the money’ and track the distribution of asset value, 
borrowing and debt in any economic sector. The extent of shareholder gain in the UK 
housebuilding industry has been transformed in the past ten years, but this is not evident 
when set against the incremental changes in new dwellings built year-on-year. We would 
readily acknowledge that this paper has only scratched the surface of specifying how these 
interrelationships play out in practice. However, the relationship between housebuilding 
firms and financial investors can be more complex than how it is promoted. The public nar-
rative emphasises how, at a time of austerity in public finances, investors are stepping in 
to provide much needed access to capital to get more houses built. In practice, it is a two-
way process: the housebuilding sector helps to sustain and enrich financial organisations by 
proving a conduit for excess capital.
There is still a largely untouched research agenda here—there is ample scope to exam-
ine cross-national capital flows more closely, and to compare the financial strategies and 
positioning of different housebuilding firms and investors. Furthermore, there is merit in 
exploring how far housebuilders are introducing new financial products and services, how 
they exert influence in practice on government interventions and financial support. Ana-
lytical advancements may also be made in mapping the complex web of shareholdings and 
new vehicles for housing investment.
In this paper, certain assumptions have also been made about the elision between share-
holder preference and executive action, and the extent to which there is a shared culture 
between different actors in the process—such as members of the Board and the executive 
team in major housebuilders. It would be instructive to examine this relationship empiri-
cally, but it is an arena unlikely to open itself up readily to independent inquiry. We should 
also be cautious at this stage about how far the detailed analysis in this paper is typical 
of wider trends when looking beyond the UK. Work is required to understand the conse-
quences of consolidation in the housebuilding sectors in different countries (cf. Wissoker 
2016). The process of financialisation is likely to take a different trajectory in different 
countries, even if the underlying process follows a similar pattern (Aalbers 2017b).
The challenge for research into the changing dynamics of the housebuilding sector is 
intensified by the fast-moving nature of the world of global finance. It is hardly an origi-
nal insight to note that finance capital has a voracious and insatiable appetite for the 
new, for moving on to another sector which is seen as more amenable to asset capture 
and institutional transformation. Since the GFC, corporate finance has alighted on UK 
The financialisation of housing production: exploring capital…
1 3
housebuilding companies, having depleted other possibilities as avenues for investment. 
It remains to be seen what we happen in the post-pandemic economy, and whether simi-
lar trends will emerge as happened after the GFC. The analysis in this paper suggests 
one should not assume that any stimulus to assist larger housebuilders—to remedy the 
foreseen fall in housing output as a result of the pandemic—will produce anything like 
the outcomes envisaged or hoped for by governments.
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